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The Evolution of the Federal Law of
Entrapment: A Need for a New Approach
Jacobson v. United States'
I. INTRODUCTION
How far can the government go in combatting crime? Should the
government be able to surreptitiously observe those it suspects of criminal
activity? May the government offer such suspects opportunities to commit
crimes or induce them to commit crimes?
The entrapment defense has been used to provide a check on government
investigation of criminal activity. Historically, there has been much
disagreement about the proper basis of the entrapment defense and its
applicability to particular situations. In Jacobson v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court had occasion to examine the proper role of the
entrapment defense in the federal courts. This Note will explain and critique
the reasoning used by the Court in Jacobson, as well as that used by
proponents of a competing theory 9f the defense, and recommend a more
rational way to deal with government inducement.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In February, 1984, Keith Jacobson, a Nebraska farmer, ordered two
magazines, entitled Bare Boys I and Bare Boys II, from a California
bookstore.2 The magazines contained photographs of nude preteen and
teenage boys.3 Jacobson testified that he was surprised at the contents of the
magazines because "he had expectedto receive photographs of 'young men 18
years or older."' 4 This testimony was unchallenged at trial.5 Jacobson's
receipt of this material was legal under both federal and Nebraska law.6
Three months later, Congress passed the Child Protection Act of 1984.'
The Act made it illegal to knowingly receive through the mails a "visual
depiction [that] involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
1. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
2. Id. at 1537.
3. i
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1542.
6. Id. at 1538.
7. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984).
1
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conduct."' In the same month that the Act became law, postal inspectors
discovered Jacobson's name on the mailing list of the bookstore from which
he had ordered Bare Boys I and II.?
In January, 1985, a postal inspector sent Jacobson a sexual attitude
questionnaire and an application for membership in the "American Hedonist
Society," a fictitious organization.'0 Jacobson enrolled in the society and
indicated on the survey that he enjoyed preteen sex but was opposed to
pedophilia." During the next sixteen months, the government did not initiate
further contact with Jacobson.12
In May of 1986, the government sent Jacobson a solicitation from
"Midlands Data Research," a fictitious consumer research company.
3
Jacobson responded: "Please feel free to send me more information, I am
interested in teenage sexuality. Please keep my name confidential."' 4
Jacobson then received a survey from "Heartland Institute for a New
Tomorrow" (HINT)." Jacobson responded to the survey and "indicated that
his interest in '[p]reteen sex-homosexual' material was above average, but not
high.0'6
After Jacobson responded to the HINT survey, a government agent
initiated correspondence with him under the pseudonym "Carl Long."'7
Jacobson responded to his "pen pal" that he was interested in "male-male
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1988).
9. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
10. Id. Included with these materials was a letter stating the Society's doctrine: "that
members had the 'right to read what we desire, the right to discuss similar interests with those
who share our philosophy, and finally that we have the right to seek pleasure without restrictions
being placed on us by outdated puritan morality.'" Id.
11. Id. The survey asked Jacobson to "rank on a scale of one to four his enjoyment of
various sexual materials, with one being 'really enjoy,' two being 'enjoy,' three being 'somewhat
enjoy,' and four being 'do not enjoy.' [Jacobson] ranked the entry 'preteen sex' as a two ....
Id.
12. IM
13. Id. The solicitation "[sought] a response from those 'who believed in the joys of sex
and the complete awareness of those lusty and youthful lads and lasses of the neophite [sic]
age,"' without indicating whether it referred to minors, young adults, or both. Id.
14. Id
15. Id. HINT portrayed itself as a lobbying organization which sought to promote sexual
freedom and freedom of choice by urging the repeal of all statutes regulating sexual activities,
with the exception of those proscribing violent behavior. HINT also provided its members with
"pen pals" through a computer matching service; Jacobson did not initiate correspondence with
any of his potential "pen pals." Id. at 1538-39.
16. IM at 1538. Jacobson also wrote: "Notonly sexual expression but freedom of the press
is under attack. We must be ever vigilant to counter attack right wing fundamentalists who are
determined to curtail our freedoms." Id.
17. Id. at 1539. The government was using a tactic known as "mirroring," which was
described as "reflecting whatever the interests are of the person we are writing to." Id.
[Vol. 58
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items," and that he liked "good looking young guys (in their late teens and
early 20's) doing their thing together."" Jacobson ended his correspondence
with "Carl Long" after two letters. 9
In March, 1987, the Customs Service received Jacobson's name from the
Postal Service.2° The Customs Service sent Jacobson a brochure from
"Produit Outaouais," a fictitious Canadian company, offering child pornogra-
phy for sale.2 Jacobson ordered photographs of young boys engaging in
sex. The order was never filled.'
The Postal Service also continued to investigate Jacobson.' It mailed
a letter to him purportedly from the "Far Eastern Trading Company Ltd.," yet
another fictitious organization,24 and invited him to send for more informa-
tion.' The letter also requested that Jacobson certify he was not an
undercover agent seeking to entrap Far Eastern Trading Company.26
Jacobson responded and received a catalogue in return.27 He then placed an
order for Boys Who Love Boys2 ' and was arrested after a controlled delivery
of the magazine.29 Federal agents searched Jacobson's home and found Bare
Boys I and H and the materials sent by the government during the course of
its investigation. 0  Jacobson was indicted on September 24, 1987 for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A).31 At trial, Jacobson claimed that he had
been entrapped by the government through its communications with him over
a twenty-six month period prior to his arrest.32 Jacobson testified that he
ordered the magazines because "the government had succeeded in piquing his
18. Id.
19. Id.





24. Id. The letter stated that "much hysterical nonsense [had] appeared in the American
media concerning 'pornography,"' and that "we have devised a method of getting these to you
without prying eyes of U.S. Customs seizing your mail... once we have posted our material





28. Id. at 1539-40. Boys Who Love Boys was a "pornographic magazine depicting young
boys engaged in various sexual activities." Id at 1540.
29. Id. at 1539-40.
30. Id. at 1540.
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curiosity."3  The jury was instructed on the entrapment defense,34 and
Jacobson was convicted. 5
Jacobson appealed his conviction.36 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals overturned Jacobson's conviction, holding that "[t]he government
must reasonably suspect that a crime has occurred or is likely to occur before
targeting an individual. '  The government then petitioned the court for
rehearing en banc, which was granted.38 Upon rehearing, the court held that
reasonable suspicion was not required prior to an undercover investigation
because the Constitution afforded individuals such as Jacobson no right to be
free from investigation.39 The court also rejected Jacobson's claim that the
conduct of the government violated due process.4"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and overturned Jacobson's
conviction.42 The Court made no mention of the reasonable suspicion
requirement imposed by the Eighth Circuit prior to the en banc rehearing.
However, the Court's statement that the government may employ inducement
if it proves predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt impliedly repudiated that
requirement.4 3 The Court held that when the government induces the
defendant to commit a crime and the defense of entrapment is properly raised,
33. Id. at 1540. Jacobson stated: "Well, the statement was made of all the trouble and the
hysteria over pornography and I wanted to see what the material was. It didn't describe the--
I didn't know for sure what kind of sexual action they were referring to in the Canadian letter
. Id.
34. Id. The jury was instructed:
As mentioned, one of the issues in this case is whether the defendant was
entrapped. If the defendant was entrapped he must be found not guilty. The
government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was not entrapped.
If the defendant before contact with law enforcement officers or their agents
did not have any intent or disposition to commit the crime charged and was induced
or persuaded by law enforcement officers o[r] their agents to commit that crime,
then he was entrapped. On the other hand, if the defendant before contact with law
enforcement officers or their agents did have an intent or disposition to commit the
crime charged, then he was not entrapped even though law enforcement officers or
their agents provided a favorable opportunity to commit the crime or made
committing the crime easier or even participated in acts essential to the crime.
Id. at 1540 n.1.
35. Id at 1540.
36. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1990).
37. Id. at 1001. The court of appeals also held that evidence of reasonable suspicion must
be obtained independently of the investigation. Id.
38. United States v. Jacobson, 899 F.2d 1549 (8th Cir. 1990).
39. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1990).
40. Id.
41. Jacobson v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
42. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct.. at 1543.
43. Id. at 1540.
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the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime before the initial contact with the government
took place.' The Court also held that evidence of predisposition to do
something which is legal is not sufficient to show predisposition to engage in
similar conduct which is illegal.45
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Origin of the Entrapment Defense in the Federal Courts
The first federal case in which a defendant was excused on the ground
of entrapment was Woo Wai v. United States.' In Woo Wai, an agent of the
Immigration Commission suspected that the defendant had knowledge of
unlawful importations of Chinese women into San Francisco.47 The agent
devised a scheme to pressure the defendant to reveal this information.48
Government agents approached the defendant and presented a plan to make
money by illegally bringing Chinese women across the Mexican border.49
On several occasions, the defendant expressed reluctance to participate in the
scheme,"0 but he finally assented and was convicted of conspiracy to violate
the immigration laws."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed based on two grounds.52
First, the facts of the case did not establish a conspiracy. 3 Second, "a sound
public policy [could] be upheld only by denying the criminality of those who
are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal
statutes."' 4  The court cited six cases to support the doctrine of entrap-
ment.5 Although entrapment was discussed and condemned in all of
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1542.
46. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
47. Id. at 413.
48. Id. The agent believed the defendant had information regarding the involvement of
Immigration Commission officers in the unlawful importations. Id.
49. Id. Immigration inspectors in San Diego represented to the defendant that they would
allow him to bring Chinese women across the border if he paid the inspectors $50 per head. Id.
50. Id. at 413-14.
51. Id. at 412.
52. Id. at 414.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 415.
55. Id. at 415-16. The six cases were: People v. McCord, 42 N.W. 1106 (Mich. 1889);
Love v. People, 43 N.E. 710 (III. 1896); Commonwealth v. Bickings, 12 Pa. Dist. 206 (1903);
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. 38 (1910); Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878);
and O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App. 665 (1879).
5
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them,56 in none was the defendant acquitted on that ground. 7 By basing
its holding on "a sound public policy," the court implied that the entrapment
defense was a matter of judicial discretion. 8 The court did not assert any
basis for the defense, and it did not specify the circumstances that would
trigger its availability. Seemingly, the holding would require a court to find
entrapment and acquit the defendant as a matter of law any time inducement
was employed by the government. The existence of the entrapment defense
in the federal courts was thus established by Woo Wai, but the contours of the
doctrine remained nebulous.
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the nature and boundaries of the
entrapment defense in Sorrells v. United States. 9 In Sorrells, the defendant
was convicted of possessing and selling liquor in violation of the National
Prohibition Act.60 A government agent went to the defendant's home along
with three acquaintances of the defendant.6 ' The agent asked the defendant
to get him some liquor, and the defendant refused.' After repeated requests,
the defendant acquiesced and obtained liquor for the agent.63 At trial, the
court ruled that no entrapment had occurred as a matter of law.'
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that if the government
merely affords opportunities for the commission of the offense, entrapment
has not occurred."6 However, if "the criminal design originates with the
officials of the Government and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commis-
sion in order that they may prosecute," entrapment has occurred.67 The
Court stated that the defense was based on a principle of statutory construc-
tion: Congress did not intend for the Prohibition Act to apply to otherwise
innocent persons whom the government encouraged to commit the offense. 8
56. See William E. Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA.
L. REv. 245, 247 (1942).
57. Id.
58. Woo Wai, 223 F. at 415.
59. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
60. Id. at 438.
61. Id. at 439.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 439-40. The agent stated that he was a member of the same division of the
military as the defendant and that he wanted the whiskey for a friend of his; the defendant stated
that he "did not fool with whiskey," but finally agreed to see if he could get some. Id.
64. Id. at 438.
65. Id. at 452.
66. Id. at 441.
67. Id. at 442.
68. Id. at 448.
[Vol. 58
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If an offense is instigated by the government, the government can
overcome the defense of entrapment by showing that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime.69 The government can introduce evidence
of the defendant's prior conduct which is relevant to show predisposition. °
In turn, the defendant can introduce evidence of the activities of the
government agents to show inducement." If reasonable people could differ
regarding the issues of inducement and predisposition, the entrapment defense
should be submitted to the jury.72 The Court noted that it did not intend for
its holding to apply to crimes so heinous that the applicable statute would
admit of no exceptions."
Justice Roberts concurred in the result but wrote separately to propound
a different theory of the defense. 4 Roberts stated, "entrapment is the
conception and planning of an offense by an officer [of the government], and
his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it
except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer."75 Roberts
disagreed with the statutory construction rationale relied on by the majority. 6
He thought the statutory construction rationale was artificial- because the
defendant's act, coupled with intent fell within the letter of the statute.77
Roberts believed the true basis for the defense was one of public policy; a
policy similar to that exercised by courts of equity when they refuse to use
their process to consummate a wrong.78
If the government instigates or induces the commission of an offense, and
the defendant would not have committed the offense in the absence of such
inducement, the defense of entrapment can be raised successfully because "no
self respecting tribunal ought to permit the consummation of so revolting a
plan as activating the commission of an offense solely for the purpose of
obtaining a conviction."79 In Roberts' view, the defendant's predisposition
69. Id. at 451.
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id. at 452.
73. Id. at 451.
74. Id. at 453 (Roberts, J., concurring).
75. Id at 454.
76. Id. at 456.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 455.
79. Id. at 454-55.
7
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to commit the offense is irrelevant.8" Moreover, he thought the issue of
entrapment was a question of law.8
The opinion in Sorrells raised more questions than it answered. The
Court did not specify the applicability of the statutory construction rationale.
It is unclear whether the holding applied to all federal statutes or only to those
creating crimes malum prohibitum.82 The Court also did not provide any
standard for measuring predisposition. Testimony regarding the defendant's
reputation was held to create a jury question on predisposition.83 The Court
did not indicate whether evidence about a defendant's reputation would always
be sufficient to create ajury question on predisposition, or if stronger evidence
would be required in some instances.
B. Application by the Supreme Court After Sorrells
The framework enunciated by the majority in Sorrells was affirmed by
Chief Justice Warren, who wrote for the majority in Sherman v. United
States." In Sherman, a government agent approached a narcotics addict
undergoing treatment to cure his addiction." The agent repeatedly requested
that the defendant supply him with narcotics; the defendant refused several
times, but eventually agreed.' Subsequently, the defendant was convicted
of selling narcotics.
The Supreme Court overturned the defendant's conviction.88 Despite
the fact that the defendant had two prior narcotics-related convictions,89 the
Court held as a matter of law that predisposition was not established." The
Court rejected the approach espoused by Justice Roberts in Sorrells,9" and
80. Id. at 455. Thus, the defendant can introduce evidence of the government's conduct to
establish inducemet, but the government cannot introduce evidence of the defendant's prior
conduct to show predisposition.
81. Id. at 457.
82. Malum prohibitum is defined as "a thing which is wrong because it is prohibited."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (6th ed. 1991).
83. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
84. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
85. Id. at 371. The agent was being treated by the same doctor as the defendant for
narcotics addiction. Id.
86. Id. The agent told the defendant he needed the drugs because he was suffering from
withdrawal. Id.
87. Id at 370.
88. Id. at 378.
89. Id. at 375. Nine years earlier, the defendant had been convicted of selling narcotics, and
five years earlier he had been convicted of possessing narcotics. Id.
90. Id. at 375-76.
91. Id. at 376-77.
[Vol. 58
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instead followed the approach of the Sorrells majority.' The Court noted
that the government would be placed at a disadvantage under the Roberts
approach: although the defendant could claim inducement, the prosecution
could not show that the offense was committed because of the defendant's
own readiness and not because of the inducement.93
The Court claimed to base its holding that predisposition was not
established as a matter of law on the fact that the defendant was undergoing
treatment to cure his narcotics addiction when the government intervened.94
However, the Court then took occasion to condemn the government for
enticing a narcotics addict undergoing treatment to sell and return to the habit
of using narcotics. 95
Sherman also raised questions regarding the doctrine of entrapment. Why
did the Court criticize the conduct of the government during the investiga-
tion?96 If it truly relied on the Sorrells framework,9 7 the government's
conduct should have been irrelevant. According to Sorrells, predisposition of
the defendant is the focus of the inquiry, not whether the court approved of
the government's conduct.9" Further, why didn't the prior convictions create
a jury question on predisposition?' Surely prior convictions for the same
offense are at least as probative on the issue of predisposition as reputation
testimony regarding the defendant, which was used in Sorrells." Sherman
seemed to indicate that while a defendant's predisposition might nominally be
relevant to rebut a claim of entrapment, in actuality the Court would consider
the conduct employed by the government in determining whether the
defendant was predisposed. Thus, the Sherman Court seemed to follow
Justice Roberts' approach"° ' under the guise of predisposition. The Court
did not want to adopt the approach used by Justice Roberts, however, because
of the severe handicap placed on the prosecution if it could not show that the
offense was committed because of the defendant's own readiness and not
because of the inducement.' °2
Although Sherman purported to affirm the Sorrells framework,0 3
subsequent lower court decisions created exceptions to it. In United States v.
92. Id. at 372-73.
93. Id. at 376-77; cf. supra note 80.
94. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76.
95. Id. at 376.
96. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
102. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376-77.
103. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
9
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Chisum,'° the defendant was charged with knowingly receiving counterfeit
money."°5  Without solicitation, the defendant approached a known
counterfeiter and indicated his interest in purchasing counterfeit bills.0 The
counterfeiter told the defendant that he was not personally interested in the
proposition, but he directed the defendant to an undercover agent.'0 7
Subsequently, the agent sold counterfeit money to the defendant, at which time
the defendant was arrested. 0 8
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment because "the acts of the government agent in delivering and
supplying the couinterfeit bills constitute entrapment as a matter of law.""°
The court reasoned that "[e]ntrapment is indistinguishable from other law
enforcement practices which the courts have held to violate due process.
'110
Thus, allowing the government to proceed against the defendant would violate
due process."'
The two principles announced in Chisum were striking. First, entrapment
would be established as a matter of law any time the government supplies
contraband to a defendant."' Second, the entrapment defense was based on
the Due Process Clause."' The first of these principles was a departure
from the Sorrells framework."' The Chisum court concluded that even
though predisposition is present, a defendant is entrapped as a matter of law
if the government supplies the contraband." 5 However, the Sorrells Court
held that entrapment is not present if the defendant is predisposed to commit
the crime." 6 No exception was made for instances when the government
supplied the contraband.
The second principle stated in Chisum was also a departure from Sorrells.
The Sorrells Court expressly stated that the entrapment defense was based on
a principle of statutory construction." 7 The Sorrells majority did not even
mention the Due Process Clause. By employing a due process analysis,"
8
104. 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
105. Id. at 1308.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id at 1308-09.
109. Id. at 1309.




114. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
115. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. at 1310-12.
116. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
117. Id. at 448.
118. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. at 1312.
[Vol. 58
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Chisum was engrafting its own notions of fundamental fairness onto the
entrapment defense. In substance, this analysis does not seem much different
from the analysis employed by Justice Roberts." 9 Rather than focusing on
predisposition, Chisum focused on the tactics employed by the government.
United States v. Bueno"2 ° is a decision which reached a result similar
to that in Chisum. In Bueno, the defendant was charged with selling
narcotics. '' The defendant was a narcotics addict, and one of his acquaintanc-
es was a government informer." The informer had purchased heroin in
Mexico and transported it to the United States."2 The defendant and the
informant prepared the heroin for sale by mixing it with brown sugar. 24
The defendant then sold the heroin to a government agent.'2
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found entrapment as a matter of
law."2 The court held that the defendant's predisposition did not defeat the
availability of the entrapment defense. 27 The court instead concluded that
when an informer supplies the contraband, entrapment as a matter of law is
established. 28 Unlike Chiswn, 29 the court did not invoke the Due Process
Clause. Rather, it stated that "[t]he defense of entrapment has undergone
much maturation since first announced by the Supreme Court," and that the
heroin sale resulted from the "creative activity of the government."' 3 ° Thus,
without explaining why, the Fifth Circuit held that entrapment is established
as a matter of law when the government furnishes contraband.' No
attempt was made to square this holding with the Sorrells framework. The
true reason for the holding in Bueno seems to be that the court found the
conduct of the government distasteful. This focus on the government's
conduct smacks of the analysis recommended by Justice Roberts in
Sorrells.1
32
119. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
120. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).
121. Id. at 904 n.l.
122. Id. The defendant was not aware that the informer was employed by the government.
Id. at 904-05.
123. Id. at 904.
124. Id. at 905.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 906.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 905.
129. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. at 1312.
130. Bueno, 447 F.2d at 906.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
11
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An unusual decision that also had the effect of departing from the
Sorrells framework was Greene v. United States.' In Greene, an undercov-
er agent was introduced to the defendants by a government informer." 4 The
defendants told the agent that they had illegally sold liquor in the past and
asked the agent if he was interested in purchasing one hundred to two hundred
gallons of liquor per week.'35 After several deliveries of bootleg liquor,
36
the defendants were convicted for possession of unregistered distilling
equipment, illegal liquor sales, and conspiracy.' The defendants argued
that they had been entrapped as a matter of law.
3 1
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the entrapment defense was
not available because the facts indicated that predisposition was present.
139
However, it then reached a curious conclusion. The court held that (1)
because the investigation lasted nearly three years, (2) the government agent
was significantly involved in the bootlegging, (3) the government agent
induced the defendants to sell the liquor, and (4) the agent was the only
customer of the defendants, the government was not entitled to prosecute the
defendants." It cited Sherman for its contention that, although the case did
not involve entrapment, "when the Government permits itself to become
enmeshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end, to the extent which
appears here, the same underlying objections which render entrapment
repugnant to American criminal justice are operative.' 4' Thus, although
entrapment was not present, the government's conduct was such that the
defendant should be acquitted based on the same rationale as the entrapment
defense. The court failed to note that the entrapment defense is the response
to government overreaching when such overreaching does not violate due
process. If entrapment is not present, the government did not overreach.
Perhaps the Court was trying to use an analysis like that used by Justice
Roberts 42 but did not comprehend that under Roberts' approach, entrapment
was present when the government engaged in overreaching;'43 Roberts'
approach in no way excused a defendant if entrapment was not present.
133. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
134. Id. at 784.
135. Id. The liquor sales were illegal because no tax had been paid on the alcohol. Id.
136. Id. at 784-86.
137. Id. at 783-84.
138. Id at 786.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 787.
141. Id
142. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58
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The Supreme Court had occasion to reexamine the basis for the
entrapment defense in United States v. Russell.'44 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, affirmed the Sorrells framework. 45 In Russell, a govern-
ment agent approached the defendant and his two codefendants and offered to
supply them with an essential ingredient for the manufacture of methamphet-
amine, in return for one-half of the drug produced."4 During the conversa-
tion, one of the codefendants stated that he had been making methamphet-
amine for the last seven months, and gave the agent a bag of methamphet-
amine representing "the last batch that we made." 47 Subsequently, the
defendant was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing and selling methamphet-
amine.
48
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction
on the ground that the agent supplied an essential ingredient to the manufac-
turing process. 9 The court stated, "[A] defense to a criminal charge may
be founded upon an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the
criminal enterprise." 1
50
The Supreme Court reversed and rejected the notion that the defense of
entrapment is established by an intolerable degree of governmental participa-
tion when the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime."' The Court
held that the defense of entrapment is relatively limited and only comes into
play when the government implants the criminal design in the mind of the
defendant.' The Court rejected the concepts set forth in Chisum, Bueno,
and Greene.' The Court stated,
The defense of entrapment enunciated in [Sorrells and Sherman] was not
intended to give the federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto over law
enforcement practices of which it did not approve. The execution of the
federal laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive
Branch of the Government, subject to applicable constitutional and statutory
limitations and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce those limita-
tions.
144. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
145. Id. at 433.
146. ld. at 425.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 424.
149. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1972).
150. Id. at 673.
151. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
152. Id. at 435-36.
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Thus, when lower courts excused defendants from the consequences of their
illegal actions because of "overzealous law enforcement," they were doing so
contrary to the dictates of Sorrells and Sherman. The Court also offered
two criticisms of the dissenters' claim'5 6 that Justice Roberts' approach
should be adopted in the federal courts. First, the defendant could claim that
he was induced to commit the crime by the government, but the government
could not show that the' defendant committed the crime because of his own
readiness and not because of the inducement." 7 Second, the Court did not
think it desirable to grant complete immunity to one who planned to commit
a crime and then committed it "simply because government undercover agents
subjected him to inducements which might have seduced a hypothetical
individual who was not so predisposed."'58
The Russell Court recognized the need to focus on the conduct of the
government agents in particularly outrageous instances. 9 In such instances,
due process could bar the government from obtaining a conviction." The
Court noted, however, that the entrapment defense itself has no constitutional
basis.16' Thus, Chisum was incorrect in predicating the entrapment defense
on the Due Process Clause. 62
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented. 63
Stewart recommended focusing on whether the government instigated the
offense, not on the defendant's predisposition."6 Stewart also stated that the
approach of Justice Roberts in Sorrells was more consistent with the
underlying rationale of the defense, 65 which Roberts believed was to
prevent the consummation of a wrong by the government."
The approach in Russell appears consistent with that used in Sorrells.
However, it did not clarify the scope of the entrapment defense any more than
Sorrells did. Although it did state that the conduct of the government was
155. Id.
156. Id at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 434. The Court quoted Sherman in support of this proposition. Id.; see supra
note 93 and accompanying text.
158. Russell, 411 U.S. at 434.
159. Id at 431-32. The Court cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), in which
an emetic solution was forced into the defendant's stomach to induce vomiting in order to
recover capsules suspected of containing narcotics, as an example of a "particularly outrageous
instance." Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32.
160. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32.
161. Id. at 433.
162. See id.; cf Chisum, 312 F. Supp. at 1312.
163. Russell, 411 U.S. at 439 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 441.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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irrelevant to a finding of predisposition in most instances, 6 it did not set
forth any standard to guide lower courts in determining whether predisposition
is present. Russell also did not indicate the types of crimes to which the
entrapment defense was applicable. By leaving these issues unresolved,
Russell left the door open for courts to focus on the conduct of the govern-
ment by fine-tuning the concept of predisposition.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority169 addressed Jacobson's contention that he had been
entrapped by the government 170 and noted that when the government
induces the commission of an offense, the entrapment defense is typically of
little use because the ready commission of the offense provides a strong
inference of predisposition.' However, Jacobson's situation was different
because he had been targeted by government agents for twenty-six months
prior to ordering the magazines. 72 Although he was predisposed to break
the law at the time he ordered the magazines, it does not necessarily follow
that he was so predisposed at the time of his initial contact with the govern-
ment."
The Court next examined the prosecution's evidence of predisposi-
tion.7 Jacobson's purchase of the Bare Boys magazines was found merely
to indicate predisposition to view sexually oriented material.' His respons-
es to government communications during the course of the investigation were
viewed as evincing a willingness to view photographs of preteen sex and to
promote a given political agenda. 76 Moreover, the government excited his
168. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
169. Justice White wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter,
and Thomas joined.
170. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541.
171. Id. The Court also noted that if the government had merely afforded Jacobson the
opportunity to purchase child pornography and he had promptly responded, a jury question on
entrapment would have existed. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. At oral argument, the government conceded that the accused must be shown to be
predisposed prior to contact with law enforcement officers. Id. at 1541 n.2.
174. Id at 1541. The prosecution's sole evidence ofpredisposition priorto the investigation
was the purchase of the Bare Boys magazines. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1542.
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interest in illegal sexual materials and pressured him to take part in a fight
against the ban on these materials.'
The Court then held that evidence of predisposition to do what was once
lawful does not, by itself, show predisposition to do the same thing after it has
been made illegal. 7 8 The Court further held that Jacobson's communica-
tions with the government were not sufficient to show predisposition prior to
his initial contact with the government because by the time of these communi-
cations, the government had succeeded in arousing his interest in illegal child
pornography.'79
B. Dissent
The dissent 80 gave great weight to the fact that Jacobson ordered child
pornography each time he was offered the opportunity to do so.' The
government's investigatory strategy was viewed as a permissible means of
ascertaining whether an individual was inclined to purchase child pornogra-
phy.' 2 The dissent then stated that predisposition should be assessed at the
time of inducement, not at the time of initial contact.' The dissent thought
that requiring a showing of predisposition at the time of initial contact would
be misread by the lower courts as imposing a reasonable suspicion require-
ment on the government before it begins undercover operations.'
4
The dissent next took issue with the majority's holding that Jacobson's
purchase of the Bare Boys magazines was not sufficient to establish predispo-
sition to purchase illegal child pornography.' This requirement was seen
as effectively engrafting a specific intent element onto the statute because not
only must the prosecution prove that a defendant was predisposed to order




179. Id. at 1543.
180. Justice O'Connor authored the dissenting opinion in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justice Kennedy joined, and in which Justice Scalia joined except as to Part II. Id.
181. Id The dissent quoted United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1977) for the proposition: "'the most important factor... is
whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to engage in criminal activity which was overcome
by repeated government inducement."' Id.
182. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544. The dissent noted that a "cold call" offering an
opportunity to purchase child pornography would be viewed with suspicion. Id.
183. Id The dissent cited Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1958) in
support of this proposition.
184. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545.
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The dissent believed that the true basis for the majority's holding was
that it disapproved of the investigatory methods employed by the govern-
ment.' 7 However, since the jury was properly instructed and sufficient
evidence of predisposition existed, its verdict should have been upheld.'88
V. COMMENT
The Jacobson decision marks a turning point in the Supreme Court's
analysis of the entrapment defense. By holding that prior legal conduct could
not as a matter of law be used to show predisposition,'89 the Court seemed
to be returning to the approach used in Sherman' and focusing on the
conduct of the government rather than on the defendant's predisposition. The
Court did not clarify the scope of the entrapment defense or indicate the types
of crimes to which it was applicable. The Court restricted the type of
evidence that can be used to show predisposition, but it did not set forth a
standard to guide the lower courts in determining if predisposition is
present.
The holding in Jacobson did not depart from precedent. However, this
statement is practically devoid of meaning when one considers the elasticity
of the entrapment defense as applied in Sorrells, Sherman, and Russell.'9'
Basically, these cases held that it is permissible for the government to induce
a defendant to commit a crime so long as the defendant was predisposed to
commit it."9 However, by not announcing any clear standards to guide
lower courts in determining if predisposition is present, the Supreme Court
leaves courts free to fashion their own interpretations of what does or does not
establish a jury question on the issue: In Sorrells, the issue of predisposition
was submitted to the jury due to testimony regarding the defendant's
reputation.'93 In Sherman, two prior convictions of the offense for which
the defendant was on trial were held as a matter of law not to constitute
predisposition.' 94  In Russell, oral declarations of the defendant's co-
defendants created a jury question on predisposition.' 95 These cases do not
set forth any principles for courts to use in determining if predisposition is
187. Id. at 1547.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1542.
190. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 68-73, 89-95, 152-162 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 68-73, 89-95, 152-62 and accompanying text.
193. Testimony was given at trial that Son'ells had the reputation of being a rum runner.
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452 (1932).
194. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958).
195. The co-defendants stated that they and the defendant were willing to manufacture
methamphetamines. Russell, 411 U.S. at 425.
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present. Moreover, Sherman is inconsistent with Sorrells and Russell, yet
Sherman purports to base its holding on Sorrells,'" and Russell quotes
Sherman approvingly." It is unclear why the two prior convictions in
Sherman were held as a matter of law not to constitute predisposition,'98
while reputation testimony was held to create a jury question in Sorrells.'1
The only explaination is that the courts were simply using the concept of
predisposition to reflect their degree of approval of the conduct employed by
the government.
The Jacobson court used the concept of predisposition in the same
manner as its predecessors. The Court held that Jacobson's prior purchase of
child pornography, coupled with his survey responses indicating a willingness
to view preteen sex, did not create a jury question on the issue of predisposi-
tion to view child pornography.' ° This holding was purportedly based on
two factors: first, Jacobson's prior purchase of pornography was legal;20 1
second, his responses to the government mailings were merely indicative of
his personal inclinations, not his willingness to break the law.2°
Although a jury could have agreed with the Court and found Jacobson
not to be predisposed, it would have been equally justified in finding
predisposition to be present. If testimony as to reputation alone is sufficient
to create a jury question on predisposition0 3 then previously committing the
same act for which the defendant is on trial,2' coupled with communications
evincing a willingness to do so, ° is also sufficient. There is no rational
basis for the Court's holding that evidence of predisposition to do what was
once lawful does not, by itself, show predisposition to do the same thing after
it has been made illegal.2" Logically, any prior conduct of the defendant
which shows a willingness to engage in the act which constitutes the crime is
relevant to show predisposition, because the issue is whether the defendant is
predisposed to commit an act which constitutes a crime, not whether the
defendant is predisposed to break the law.2" Thus, Jacobson's predisposi-
tion to order child pornography was relevant regardless of whether he knew
it was illegal. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the defendant's
196. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73.
197. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 434.
198. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375.
199. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
200. Jacobson, 112 U.S. at 1542.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
204. See Jacobson, 112 U.S. at 1542.
205. See id. at 1538-39.
206. See id., at 1542.
207. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
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ignorance as to the illegality of his or her act is normally of no consequence
in a criminal prosecution. Why could Jacobson's predisposition only be
shown by prior illegal conduct when he could have been prosecuted for doing
an illegal act without any knowledge of the act's illegality?
Although the holding of the majority has no logical underpinnings, the
dissent is incorrect in stating that the majority added a specific intent element
to the crime of receiving child pornography through the mails." 8 The
majority's holding is more akin to promulgating a rule of evidence than
imposing a specific intent requirement. Had receiving child pornography
through the mails been illegal at the time Jacobson ordered the Bare Boys
magazines, his prior purchase would create a jury question on predisposition,
according to the rule announced by the majority.20 However, if that had
been the case the majority likely would have used some other device to adjust
the concept of predisposition, rather than focusing on whether Jacobson's
conduct was illegal, because their holding actually rested on their disapproval
of the investigation of Jacobson. This case should not be read as imposing a
specific intent requirement, but instead as showing the Court's willingness to
scrutinize the conduct of the government in undercover investigations.
The majority conceded that Jacobson was predisposed to order child
pornography at the time he ordered it.2 ' However, the Court then held that
his predisposition was the product of the government's investigation.2" The
reasoning used by the majority is strange. The Court stated that normally, a
defendant's ready commission of an offense demonstrates predisposition.212
However, because the government sent various surveys to the defendant over
a twenty-six month period, his predisposition could not be established
independently of the government communications. 23  A more realistic
analysis is that Jacobson's responses to the surveys214 created a jury question
on whether he was predisposed to purchase child pornography, because a
rational jury could find that one interested in preteen sex would be inclined
to order child pornography. At no time did Jacobson refuse to order child
pornography or do anything other than show an interest in it.
211
The dissent was quick to dispute the majority's findings with regard to
predisposition,216 but the dissenters also applied an incorrect analysis. Their
contention that predisposition should be assessed at the time the government
208. See Jacobson, 112 U.S. at 1546-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 1541-42.
210. Id. at 1543.
211. Id. at 1542.
212. Id. at 1541.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 1538.
215. Id. at 1543.
216. See id. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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agent first suggested the crime, not at the time of initial contact,27 is based
on an improper reading of Sherman. The Sherman Court held that predisposi-
tion must be shown at the time the defendant is approached by the government
agent .2 " However, the distinction between time of approach and time of
inducement is irrelevant in this case. This distinction is germane only when
there is some evidence that the defendant was initially reluctant to commit the
crime219 and this reluctance is overcome by government inducement. If the
defendant manifests predisposition after government contact, this predisposi-
tion was presumedly present when the defendant was first approached by the
government: predisposition does not change overnight. Absent any indication
otherwise, such as initial reluctance or refusal to commit the proscribed act,
this presumption should stand.
Jacobson's survey responses should have been viewed as showing
predisposition to purchase child pornography before the government began its
investigation. Because he did not manifest any hesitancy to purchase or view
child pornography but instead indicated an interest in doing so, the time of
approach/time of inducement distinction made by both the majority and the
dissent is meaningless.
The true basis for the holding in Jacobson is that the Court simply did
not approve of the government's investigatory tactics. The Court did a
Roberts-type analysis under the guise of predisposition." The Court
discussed at length the extensive investigation of Jacobson,"' and this
investigation undoubtedly strongly influenced the Court's fine-tuning of the
concept of predisposition. Although the Court used a Roberts-type approach
in reaching its decision, it probably did not want to explicitly adopt that
approach for use in the federal courts because of the disadvantages to the
prosecution in using it as mentioned by Sherman' and Russell.' The
reasoning used by the Court is illogical, but Sorrells, Sherman, and Russell
leave plenty of room for courts to decide cases illogically while not departing
from the precedential guidelines. 24 No standards exist to guide courts
confronted with the defense other than a vague framework which leaves courts
free to reach whatever result is to their liking.
The Jacobson decision is a prime example of the incoherence associated
with the federal law of entrapment. The decision did nothing to clarify the
217. Id. at 1543.
218. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375.
219. See, e.g., Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1915).
220. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-57 for Justice Roberts' analysis.
221. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538-40.
222. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76.
223. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 434.
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scope of the entrapment defense, nor did it set forth any guidelines for lower
courts. Further, it did not indicate the types of crimes to which the defense
is inapplicable. The Court merely concluded that Congress did not intend for
the statute prohibiting the receipt of child pornography through the mails to
apply to Jacobson.2' The Court in effect restated the principles of Sorrells
without offering any guidance as to how these principles should be applied.
As stated in connection with Sorrells,"6 the defense is based on a principle
of statutory construction: Congress did not intend for the statute in question
to apply to individuals induced to commit the crime by the government if the
individuals were not otherwise predisposed.' This rationale for the defense
simply does not hold up when subjected to careful analysis.
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat (ignorance of the law excuses no one)
is a doctrine deeply imbedded in Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.'
In Rosen v. United States,29 the defendant was indicted for mailing obscene
matter, and defended on the ground that he did not know the matter he mailed
was obscene. To this defense the Court replied, "Congress did not intend that
the question as to the character of the paper should depend upon the opinion
or belief of the person who, with knowledge or notice of its contents, assumed
the responsibility of putting it in the mails of the United States."'  The
possible injustice to the defendant was not a factor in the Court's decision.
However, as one commentator has noted,"3 the injustice involved in
applying the statute in a typical entrapment case is certainly less than in cases
in which the defendant did not and could not know of the existence of the
statute,2 yet entrapment is allowed on the ground of Congressional intent.
It is difficult to see how Congress intended entrapment as a defense when a
person knowingly violates the law while under no compulsion, necessity, or
infirmity of reason.23' Congress' intent in enacting criminal statutes is to
prevent the forbidden conduct by punishing those who violate their provi-
sions." It cannot seriously be contended that Congress intended to punish
those unaware of the illegality of their conduct, yet it did not intend to punish
those who intentionally violate the law but were subject to government
inducement. The preoccupation with predisposition in Sorrells,23
225. Jacobson, 112 S.Ct. at 1543.
226. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448.
227. See id.
228. JOSHUA DREsSLER, UNDERSTANDING Cm INAu LAW § 13.01 (1987).
229. 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
230. Id. at 41.




235. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439.
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Sherman,"6 Russell, 7 and Jacobson" has no merit because it has no
foundation upon which to rest.
The inadequacy of the statutory construction principle, highlighted by the
Supreme Court's tergiversations on the issue of what constitutes predisposi-
tion,"29 compels the conclusion that statutory construction should be
discarded as a basis for the entrapment defense. An alternative basis for the
defense was stated by Justice Roberts in his Sorrells concurrence.24 Roberts
believed that the true basis of the defense was one of public policy, analogous
to courts of equity not allowing the use of their process to consummate a
wrong. However, the basis for the defense stated by Roberts does not
withstand close scrutiny.
Roberts' analogy to the equity rule is effectively refuted by the Sorrells
majority.242 The majority pointed out:
When courts of law refuse to sustain alleged causes of action which grow
out of illegal schemes, the applicable law itself denies the right to recover.
Where courts of equity refuse equitable relief because complainants come
with unclean hands they are administering principles of equitable jurispru-
dence governing equitable rights. But in a criminal prosecution, the statute
defining the offense is necessarily the law of the case.243
As one commentator has noted, a better analogy than the equity rule is
the use of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule because Fourth Amend-
ment cases also involve wrongful government conduct.2 " In Fourth
Amendment cases, however, the illegally seized evidence is merely exclud-
ed; 4 the defendantis not entitled to an acquittal because of the illegal acts
of the government. 6 That being the case, acquittal does not seem justified
merely because the defendant was subjected to government inducement.
Roberts' claim that the doctrine of entrapment rests on a rule of public
policy 7 is anomalous. In his concurrence, Roberts stated, "The protection
of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple
236. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76.
237. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
238. See Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
239. See supra notes 96-102; 220-23 and accompanying text.
240. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-57 (Roberts, J., concurring).
241. See id. at 455.
242. Id. at 450.
243. Id
244. Mikell, supra note 56, at 262.
245. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
246. See Mikell, supra note 56, at 262.
247. See Sorrells,287 U.S. at 455.
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belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court and the court alone
to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal
law.
2 48
It has already been noted that the entrapment defense has no constitution-
al basis.249 Thus, applying a statute to a defendant induced to commit the
offense by the government is not unconstitutional. Hence, what grounds does
a court have for refusing to apply a constitutional statute intended by the
legislature' 0 to apply to the facts of a particular case?" To say that
courts can set aside a constitutional statute because its enforcement would
violate public policy is to say either that Congress did not consider the rules
of public policy in enacting the statute, or that Congress intended to violate
these rules; yet the reason Congress promulgated the statute was that it
determined the prohibited conduct was against public policy.1 2
In attempting to justify the doctrine of entrapment, the Sorrells majority
and concurring opinions cancel each other out. What is left is a defense that
has been applied in a vagarious fashion because it simply has no basis. The
current approach to the defense, as exemplified by Jacobson, should be
eliminated. Defendants induced to commit a crime by the government deserve
less sympathy than some defendants who are convicted," 3 yet they can be
excused on the ground of entrapment." 4
If public policy compels the elimination of government inducement,
Congress should so specify when it enacts a particular statute. For example,
a criminal statute could be worded: "It shall be unlawful to knowingly...
unless such acts were induced by government officials." This type of wording
would provide an affirmative defense to those who committed the offense at
the behest of the government.
Conversely, should Congress decide that induced defendants should not
be entitled to an acquittal, but government inducement should be prohibited,
it could pass statutes forbidding government agents from inducing people to
commit crimes.?" If government agents were subject to criminal penalties
for inducing the commission of crimes, the practice of entrapment would
likely cease."
Either of these approaches would avoid the uncertainties present in the
current state of the law. Courts would not need to determine on a case-by-
248. Id.
249. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
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case basis whether or not Congress intended for the statute at issue to apply
to the particular defendant. Further, a defendant's conviction would not
depend on whether the current Supreme Court has adopted a relatively rigid
or low threshold for establishing predisposition, which would introduce a
degree of predictability in the law. The advantages of this predictability are
apparent. For example, Keith Jacobson was found not to be predisposed to
purchase child pornography even though he had done so previously,2' yet
a defendant such as the one in Sorrells faces conviction due to mere testimony
regarding his or her reputation. 28  This result is not fair. A criminal
conviction should not depend on a court's construction of the ill-defined
concept of predisposition when Congress has at its disposal the means to
rectify this situation. The decision of what to do with induced defendants
should be made by Congress, not by the courts.
J. PATRICK SULLIVAN
/
257. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct at 1541-42.
258. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
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